This paper considers a class of contracts in which parties write detailed, long-term performance obligations yet leave one or both parties broad discretion to terminate the agreement on short notice with little or no penalty. If the purpose of formal contracting is to make agreements legally enforceable, why would transactors go to the trouble of specifying complex price and performance obligations that either party can walk away from at will? The paper shows that formal contracts may be valuable, even where termination is the only sanction available to the parties, as a way of economizing on the cost of determining prices for a series of heterogeneous transactions. The theory is then used to analyze the structure of contracts between freight carriers and drivers and, in particular, the means by which haul prices are determined. Both the overall structure and pricing arrangements in these contracts support the proposition that ex post bargaining costs can affect the use and design of contracts even in the absence of significant relationship-specific investments.
1 Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) are the classic citations. For the most part, the agency literature, including the property-rights/incomplete-contract framework of Hart et al., does not address multiperiod contracts. One exception is MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) , which shows, among other things, that a multiperiod, fixed-price contract "ensures efficient general [i.e., non-specific] investments when there are [exogenous] turnover costs" (832). The same result could also be achieved in their model, however, with a series of one-period contracts. Long-term contracting may also serve as a way for risk averse agents to smooth income over time in the presence of imperfect capital markets (see, e.g., the discussion in Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). 3 and perils of full-scale, zero-sum bargaining. When those costs are expected to large, so will be the benefits of securing at the outset the price at which future transactions will take place. In the now-standard formulation, gains to long-term contracting -a contract covering a series of future transactions -arise because (i) relationship-specific investments increase appropriable quasi-rents and, thereby, expected bargaining costs; and (ii) such investments are often durable and thus capable of supporting production and exchange over an extended period. If trade requires no specific investments (reliance), there is little need for contracting; and if assets are specific but not durable (transaction-but not relationship-specific, one might say), then there is little to be gained from a contract that covers more than the immediate transaction.
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Although relationship-specific investments plausibly increase the costs of reaching agreement on price, their absence does not eliminate those costs entirely. Every transaction involves at least some minimal amount of attention to determining what is being bought or sold and what the price is (or should be). The time and effort devoted to such inspection and evaluation will usually be greater for complex goods and for goods that can vary widely in value. But even in cases where the costs of settling on price are not particularly large, savings from arrangements that reduce or avoid those costs may still be significant if accumulated over large numbers of transactions. Such may be the case, as has been claimed for diamonds and movies, if the parties know the distribution of values but cannot determine the value of individual items without costly inspection. By bundling transactions and charging a uniform price for the bundle, the parties save the expense of inspecting and negotiating a price for each item individually (Barzel, 1982; Kenney and Klein, 1983 ; see also Gallick, 1996) . Although the phenomenon of bundling goods for sale at a point in time motivates these analyses, the savings in inspection and bargaining costs should also accrue to "intertemporal bundling" where parties anticipate a succession of similar but heterogenous transactions and agree to a price (or a pricing mechanism) for multiple transactions over time.
2
A second implication of costly pricing is that parties will have an incentive to choose prices in such a way that neither is tempted to renege on or seek to renegotiate the prices on which they have previously agreed. Agreement on a future price is not a guarantee that exchange at that price will take place. A party to a contract may discover after the fact that the terms agreed to have become disadvantageous and prefer not to perform. Court enforcement can make reneging more difficult, but a transactor dissatisfied with a contract's terms will often be able, given the cost and imperfections of court ordering, to exploit gaps and ambiguities in an effort to contrive cancellation (Williamson, 1983) , evade performance (Goetz and Scott, 1983) or otherwise force a renegotiation of those terms.
3 Because their objective is the redistribution of existing contractual surpluses, such efforts, "together with the other party's efforts to counteract them" (Goetz and Scott, 1983 : 977) represent a form of rent-seeking, the cost of which diminishes the value of the transaction. This prospect introduces a third role for price: To the extent that the realized distribution of contractual surpluses affects the likelihood of conflict during contract execution -i.e., that parties greatly disadvantaged by the terms of a contract will seek to evade or renegotiate a previous deal -contracting parties have an incentive to choose prices so as to divide ex post rents "equitably" (Masten, 1988) or, equivalently, to achieve what Oliver Williamson (1983) has called "hazard equilibration."
and the expense of invoking legal sanctions, parties are likely to prefer self-help (such as termination) to court ordering in dealing with transgressions. With the loss of future cooperation serving as the principal deterrent of opportunism, the benefits of contractually bundling transactions will depend critically on transactions remaining within the "self-enforcing range" (Klein, 1992) .
Price Determination and Long-Term Contracting
In this section, I develop a simple model that illustrates some of the arguments in the preceding section. 5 In the model, a buyer and seller expect to undertake a series of transactions indefinitely into the future, the value and cost of which are uncertain and depend on the realized attributes of each transaction.
Specifically, let v = the uncertain value (net revenue) of the transaction to the buyer (gross of payments to the seller), and s = the uncertain cost of performing the transaction to the seller, which I assume to be jointly distributed as F (v,s) .
To abstract from risk-sharing and incentive-alignment considerations, I assume that the buyer and seller are risk neutral and that v and s are determined by factors outside the transactors' control. Trade between the buyer and seller is efficient if the expected joint surplus for a particular transaction is nonnegative, i.e., E(v-s) > 0. Each party's willingness to transact, in turn, depends on its expected private surplus and, thus, on price. Let the negotiated price given v and s be pN = γ v + (1 -γ )s contracting, which turns explicitly on a "transformation" in the costs of reaching agreement on price taking place at the time specific investments are made, with the costs of negotiating price in the presence of large relationship-specific investments being substantially larger than the costs of agreeing on price ex ante (see, e.g., Williamson, 1985: 61-2) . Although it is possible (even likely) that costs of settling on price prior to versus at the time of an exchange may differ even in the absence of relationship-specific investments, the size and direction of such differences are not clear a priori. The assumption in the current model -that the costs of reaching agreement are the same regardless of their timingassures that the value of forward pricing does not turn on arbitrarily assumed differences between ex ante and ex post negotiation costs. 6 where γ 0 [0, 1] reflects the transactors' relative bargaining power. For a given γ, pN is a function of the realizations of v and s, implying a distribution G over pN that maps the joint distribution of v and s, F(v,s) , into G(pN) such that higher realizations of v or s imply higher pNs.
Consistent with the discussion in the preceding section, I assume that reaching agreement on price is, to some nontrivial degree, costly, reflecting such things as the time and effort required for buyers to communicate, and for sellers to assess, the attributes of each transaction and to settle on a price. 6 Let n B and n S represent these costs to the buyer and seller, respectively. For the present analysis, I assume that the costs of reaching agreement on price are the same regardless of when negotiations take place and which transactor initiates a renegotiation.
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Because the model abstracts away from risk-sharing and incentive-alignment considerations, the costs of agreeing on price represent the only source of deviation from the maximum joint surplus available to the buyer or seller. Thus, were the parties to negotiate prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis over the (indefinite) life of the buyer-supplier relationship, the realized present discounted value of the relationship would be reduced from its potential value by
Because there is no investment, effort, or other substantive actions in the model, substantive incentive issues do not arise in the analysis. The motive for bundling and for price adjustment in the model is therefore exclusively the avoidance of post-agreement conflict. Oyer (2004) has analyzed the implications of an "ex post participation" motive for managerial compensation arrangements. In addition to positing positive renegotiation costs, Oyer's analysis of managerial compensation resembles the present analysis in (i) ruling out marginal incentive considerations and (ii) the absence of significant relationship-specific investments. His treatment differs, in part, in its assumption of agent risk aversion and in its emphasis on variation in agents' outside options as opposed to transaction heterogeneity. Also see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2005) . Finally, Hart and Moore (2006) develop a model similar in spirit but based on "feelings of entitlement."
9 If agreeing on price were costless, the parties would always renegotiate the contract price, but then there would also be no reason to contract in the first place.
where r is the one-period discount rate. Gains in the model arise only to the extent that transactors can devise arrangements that lower negotiation costs relative to that level. 8 3.1. "Hazard equilibration"
As suggested above, one way that transactors may be able to reduce negotiation costs is by "bundling" two or more transactions and agreeing to a uniform price, say p k , for each. By setting a price p k = E(pN), the parties will do as well, in expected terms, as if they had negotiated each transaction separately but will, at least potentially, avoid the costs they would have incurred negotiating a price for individual transactions contemporaneously, thereby leaving a larger aggregate surplus to divide between them. If the parties were to agree to price all future transactions this way, and if they always honored their agreement, the savings from bundling transactions would be equal to the present value of the negotiation costs avoided for the transactions included in the bundle, less the initial cost of reaching agreement on the contract price, or
As a rule, however, transactors cannot be expected to honor their price agreements faithfully: Except in cases where p k = pN (i.e., the agreed-on price exactly equals the price that they would have negotiated given realized v and s), one or the other party will discover that the agreed-on price is a bad deal relative to the negotiated price. More precisely, the party wishing to renegotiate will find that reopening an agreement in hopes of eliciting a better price is worthwhile whenever the expected private gain from renegotiation is enough to cover the private cost of renegotiation. 9 Looking at a single transaction in isolation, the seller would prefer to renege on its promise and renegotiate price if
and the buyer if
The areas of performance and rejection implied by this structure are depicted in figure 1.
The expectation of repeat dealings, however, implies that transactors may be further deterred from reneging on their price agreements by the threat of lost future cooperation. Assuming the potential to trade indefinitely, the buyer's and seller's rejection decisions become
(1') and (2' ) where a zero subscript denotes current period prices, and W S and W B represent seller and buyer "reputational capital" (Klein, 1992) , that is, the discounted stream of expected future profits from ongoing exchange.
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Inequalities (1') and (2') implicitly define what Klein (1992) refers to as the "self-enforcing range" of a transaction, represented here by the set
The higher the probability that the renegotiated price, pN, falls within φ*, the smaller the probability that renegotiation will occur and, consequently, the greater the proportion of potential joint surpluses the parties will realize. Since renegotiation costs are the only source of inefficiency in the model, the parties want to minimize the likelihood that transactions fall outside this range. Formally, the buyer and seller wish to choose the price, p k ,that minimizes expected negotiation costs over all transactions, or .
The first-order condition characterizing the solution to this problem is simply that is, the optimal contract price equates the marginal probability of buyer and seller reneging and, in this sense, "equilibrates hazards" (Williamson, 1983) . In the symmetric case -that is, under symmetric negotiation costs and distribution of pN -this optimal forward price is p k = E(pN), that is, the expected negotiated price over the set of potential (surplus-generating) transactions. Figure 2 illustrates the solution for this special case by superimposing g(pN) on figure 1. Taking into account the possibility of reneging, the expected per-period savings to the transactors from agreeing on price ex ante becomes the sum of (per-transaction) renegotiation costs, n = n B +n S , times the probability that the renegotiated price lies within the self-enforcing range, or n CPr(pN0φ*). Under the assumption that the parties incur costs to reach agreement on a contract price in the first place, transactors will not find it advantageous to forward price (i.e., to choose p k prior to realizing v and s) if they expect to transact only once because the ex ante cost of agreeing on the contract price plus the expected cost of ex post renegotiation, n + (n CPr(pNóφ*)/(1+r)), will always be greater than the cost of simply negotiating price at the time of the transaction, n. 11 Hence, contracts in the setting of this model must always be long-term in the sense that they must cover (bundle) at least two periods (transactions).
Bundling multiple transactions increases expected surpluses, and makes contracting more attractive, in two ways: First, adding one more transaction to a bundle of τ transactions (extending the duration of an agreement from τ to τ + 1) saves n CPr(pN0φ*)/(1+r)
τ+1
, the expected reduction in renegotiation costs in period τ + 1 (discounted to present value). Second, covering an additional transaction also increases the selfenforcing range, φ*, by increasing the level of reputational capital, W = W S + W B , in periods already covered by the contract.
Adding transaction τ+1 to the bundle increases total reputational capital in period τ, as viewed from the current period, by
In addition, however, the increase in reputational capital in period τ (again, viewed from time 0) increases reputational capital in period τ-1, which increases it in τ-2, and so on, so that
.
Recall that the agreements envisioned here, consistent with the contracts discussed in the introduction, are easily terminable by either party. The ability to terminate without penalty means that many of the contracting hazards that limit the duration of conventional, court-enforced contracts -rigidity and potential litigation costs -are not present here. Although adding another transaction to the bundle is always beneficial, the benefit decreases with contract duration when the stationarity assumption on G(p t N) is relaxed. To see this, let μ and σ represent the mean (expected value) and standard deviation of the renegotiated price, pN, and assume that where μ t represents the mean of G(p t N) and ε is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σ ε . This process has two consequences. First, the variance of p t Nincreases proportionally to the number of time periods forward (the further into the future) we look. Specifically, the variance of p t N viewed from period 0 will be Because the probability of being within the self-enforcing range for any given contract price decreases as the variance of p t N increases, and because σ 2 t increases with tN, the expected gain from forward pricing falls as tN increases. Second, even though, under the process defined above, the expected (mean) renegotiated price in any future period, as viewed from any given period, is the same for all periods (i.e., E(p t N) = μ t = μ, for all t>1), the expected value of p t N may shift as time passes: Because the mean of the distribution of p t N in periods t > 1 depends on past realizations of ε (is path dependent), the price that turns out to minimize expected future negotiation costs going forward may not be the price that was expected to do so in earlier periods. And because the variance of μ t increases as we look at more distance dates, the probability that μ t will deviate from μ grows as we look further forward as well. Hence, the likelihood that the parties will find it desirable to renegotiate the contract price, in addition to individual transaction prices, increases with contract duration, reducing further the expected benefit of bundling transactions at more distant dates. ( 1 (1 ( 1) ).
If the distribution of negotiated prices, G(p t N), is stationary (identical for all periods), increasing contract duration is always beneficial. Consequently, if transactors contract, the optimal contract will be of indefinite duration (have no specific termination date). 13 The decision to contract, then, will be depend on the present value of expected negotiation costs with and without a contract, with contracting preferred if 14 In principle, more complex (e.g., nonlinear or state-contingent) price adjustment methods could also be devised but, as discussed below, would involve a tradeoff between greater accuracy and increased formation or implementation costs. 12 which, after manipulation, reduces to Pr(p t N 0 φ*) > r. Hence, transactors will prefer an agreement of indefinite duration to no contract (period-by-period negotiation) if the probability of being within the selfenforcing range is greater than the relevant discount rate. Since the relevant discount rate depends on the interval between transactions, this condition will be more easily satisfied, other things the same, the more frequently transactions recur.
Price adjustment
The same considerations that motivate bundling of sequential transactions also create an incentive to devise low-cost ways (relative to renegotiation) of adjusting the contract price during the term of the contract. In particular, to the extent the parties can identify a set of transaction attributes, X, that are correlated with p t N, transactors can reduce the probability of finding themselves outside of the self-enforcing range by relating the contract price p k to X.
14 As illustrated in figure 3, setting p k = αX affects expected renegotiation costs (assuming σ pNX … 0) in two ways: (i) it reduces the variance of (pN-p k ) (represented as the change from g(pN-μ) to g(pN-αX) in figure 3); and (ii) it increases W B and W S and, thus, the size of the selfenforcing range (depicted along the horizontal axis). The combined effect is a reduction in the probability of being outside the self-enforcing range equal to the difference between the light and dark shaded areas of figure 3.
As in other settings, the choice of variable(s) to which to relate price will involve a tradeoff between accuracy (how well X correlates with p t N) and the costs of implementing price adjustment formula, particularly
See, for example, Goldberg (1985: 533) : " While indexing would be the easiest price adjustment mechanism to implement, it has the obvious disadvantage of tracking changing conditions imperfectly. ... Cost-plus pricing tracks cost changes more closely, but is more subject to manipulation; it also gives the seller poorer incentives to control costs, and requires that the parties devote more resources to monitoring performance." See also, Crocker and Masten (1991) , and, in an employment context, Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 215) : "To base a compensation formula on something that is not objectively measurable is to invite disputes and unhappiness among employees," presumably because of concern that difficult to verify measures may be reported strategically. 16 A number of recent studies have examined various aspects of trucking organization. See, in particular, Arrunada et al. (2004) ; Hubbard (2004, 2005) ; Hubbard (2001 Hubbard ( , 2003 ; and Nickerson and Silverman (2003) . 17 The survey was conducted in two waves, the first during the summer of 1997 and the second in August and September of 1998, and was carried out under a two-stage randomized design: In the first stage, truck stops were randomly selected as interview sites to be representative of the volume of truck traffic across the Midwest. In the second 13 the ability of the parties to manipulate and verify the chosen measure(s). 15 Other things the same, the larger the variance of p t N (σ t 2 ), the greater the value of more accurate price adjustment (choosing X with high σ pNX ).
The Governance of Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking
In the remainder of the paper, I examine the nature of contracts between truck drivers and carriers in light of the previous analysis. 16 I begin with an overview of the U.S. trucking industry and follow that with an analysis drawing on a survey of truck drivers conducted by the University of Michigan Trucking Industry Program (UMTIP), which contains information on, among other things, the characteristics of drivers, their equipment, and their most recent hauls.
stage, respondents were chosen at random at the selected sites. This sampling procedure specifically sought to target over-the-road truck drivers, who are much more likely than local drivers to use the services offered at truck stops. For more information, see Belman et al. (1998). 18 It is estimated that 7.7 billion tons of freight were transported by truck in the United States during 1997 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999 ). An average payload of about 15 tons would thus imply something on the order of 500 million hauls per year. 14 4.1. Industry background The U.S. trucking industry is highly competitive, consisting of more than ninety-thousand "for-hire" trucking companies, or carriers (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000) . In addition to firms whose main business is trucking, trucking transportation is also provided "in-house" by non-trucking companies that maintain private truck fleets to transport their own goods. Trucking firms also compete with freight transportation by rail, water (ships and barges), and air, as well as, for commodities such as petroleum and natural gas, pipelines.
Carriers function essentially as brokers or middlemen, identifying and selling transportation services to shippers, on one side, and matching those shipments with trucks and drivers -either employees who drive carrier-owned vehicles or owner-operators who provide their own trucks -on the other. Viewed in the aggregate, the scheduling of transportation services so that the right commodities arrive at the right location at the right time and at the lowest possible cost is a logistical problem of enormous proportions. Each year, truckers carry millions of hauls over millions of miles for millions of customers between thousands of locations.
18 Even if all cargos and equipment were interchangeable, determining the optimal route structure and assignment of hauls would constitute a classic logistical problem requiring considerable time and expertise to solve. In actuality, however, hauls vary significantly in size, weight, distance, route, back-haul potential, and the extent to which they require special care (because of fragility or perishability, for example) or special equipment (such as car carriers, refrigerated trailers, or oversize or flatbed trailers). Moreover, the efficient assignment of hauls often depends on characteristics of consumers and suppliers of freight services as well as of cargos and routes. On the demand side, shippers and receivers differ with respect to, among Some transportation assets, such as rail lines and loading equipment, are sometimes specific to a particular shipper (see Pittman, 1992; and Saussier, 2000) . In addition, vehicles may, on occasion, be designed to carry specific loads for particular shippers, as were automobile carriers and some chemical tank cars in Palay's (1984) study of rail transport. Nevertheless, the great bulk of freight-hauling assets, even those specially designed to carry a particular type of cargo, such as automobiles or chemicals, are rarely specific to a particular shipper or carrier.
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Some recent research has sought to relate organization in various segments of the trucking industry to, among other factors, imperfect substitutability of trucks and trailers (e.g., Nickerson and Silverman, 2003 , who argue that differences in optimal tractor drive-chain configurations for pulling different types of hauls reduce the interchangeability of trucks and trailers) or short-term location-or "temporal specificity" (e.g. Arrunada et al., 2004; and Hubbard, 2001 ; see also Pirrong, 1994 , on the organization of ocean shipping.) The rents resulting from these considerations in trucking, however, are small (in the tens or possibly hundreds of dollars) and highly transitory (measured in hours or, at most, days) both in absolute terms and compared to other industries where asset specificity is important.
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other things, the premium they place on speed or on-time performance relative to price, their reliability in meeting schedules, the predictability of their shipments and flexibility in accommodating pickups and deliveries, and their staffing of, and congestion at, loading docks. On the supply side, drivers, who, in the first instance, bear the costs of hauling freight, differ in their preferences over such things as routes, night driving, and haul lengths as well as in their ability and dependability. Last but not least, the matching of hauls, clients, and drivers must be performed and continually revised in light of ever-changing weather, traffic, equipment, and road conditions.
The primary physical assets used in trucking -trucks and trailers -are obviously mobile and are largely general purpose in function. Although some trailer types are better suited to some products than others -tank trailers for liquids and flatbed trailers for oversize loads, for instance -a given trailer can generally be used to serve a large number of shippers.
19 Trailers, moreover, can be hitched to and pulled by most any truck tractor. 20 Finally, cargo-handling skills and the knowledge required to operate trucking equipment, however specialized, are rarely specific to a shipper or carrier. Because of this fungibility in use and mobility, trucks have often been held out as quintessential non-specific assets -literally assets on wheels.
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By definition, permanent leases must be for at least thirty days.
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Excluded from the present analysis are local-delivery-and-pick-up drivers and drivers who work for private fleets (i.e., companies with "in-house" transportation units) or for the government. These sectors do not face (at least not to the same extent) the matching and coordination problems that characterize the for-hire sector. 
Carrier-Driver Contracts
General features. Despite the absence of large, durable relationship-specific investments, carrierdriver transactions are governed mainly through either vertical integration -employee drivers operating carrier-owned trucks -or long-term contracts called "permanent leases" under which an owner-operator agrees to pull a specific carrier's hauls exclusively for some (possibly indefinite) period.
21 Table 1 contains summary statistics on the characteristics of drivers, their equipment, and terms of employment from the UMTIP survey. Of the 1,019 truck drivers interviewed, 798 were for-hire, over-the-road (i.e. long distance)
drivers. 22 Of the latter, 572 (72%) were employee drivers, meaning that they drove trucks owned by the carrier, and the remainder, 226 (28%) were owner-operators, drivers who own and operate their own trucks.
Over 70% of the owner-operators acquired their loads under a permanent lease. Of the remainder, most acquired shipments either under contracts directly with shippers (10%) or from freight brokers (13%).
The UMTIP survey did not collect information on lease duration or termination provisions, but other sources indicate that permanent leases range from thirty days to indefinite term (Lafontaine, 2000) and, though nominally long term, "typically can be terminated by either party at will, except mid-haul" (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003: 94; see also, Lafontaine, 2000) . Less drastic than termination, drivers might alternatively reject or seek to renegotiate the fee for an assigned haul that fell outside the self-enforcing range.
As shown in table 1, 76% of owner-operators in the UMTIP survey indicated that their leases afforded them some rights to influence which loads they carried. But even drivers who reported that they had no control over load assignments did not necessarily just passively accept undesirable loads: When asked what the driver would do when a dispatcher or shipper assigned an unrealistic delivery, of the fifty-three owner-operators 23 This is, in fact, how truckers who work through brokers are normally paid. A contract for a single haul is known as a trip lease. 17 who said they had no control over load assignment, twenty-nine said that they would "renegotiate the time," five that they would "refuse the load," and one that he would "fight it" or "argue with" the dispatcher.
Although company (employee) drivers were much less likely than owner-operators to have formal discretion over load assignments -less than a third indicated a right to choose or reject hauls -many nevertheless indicated a willingness to challenge undesirable assignments: Of the 365 employee drivers who reported that they had no control over load assignments, a majority (203) said they would "renegotiate the time," another thirty-six that they would "refuse the load," and eight that they would "fight it" or "argue with" the dispatcher if assigned an unrealistic delivery. Ultimately, of course, an employee driver dissatisfied with a carrier's load assignments can reject undesirable load assignments by quitting (termination).
Haul pricing. If the central substantive problem in freight hauling is logistical -i.e., the coordination of a large number of small, heterogeneous transactions -the central organizational problem is one of pricing driver services given the heterogeneity of hauls. In principle, carriers could simply negotiate a fee with each driver taking into account the characteristics of each haul: Hauls that drivers considered costly or unattractive would command a premium over more "driver friendly" hauls. 23 With such a large number of heterogeneous hauls, however, negotiating an acceptable fee for each haul would add yet another dimension to the carrier's already complex logistical problem. And indeed, carriers consider such haul-by-haul pricing impractical: "The feeling in dispatch is that having different pay rates becomes a nightmare of trying to sell loads to drivers" (Goodson, 1999b: 1) . A fixed, per-haul fee for every load would avoid the "nightmare" of haul-by-haul pricing but would likely result in frequent renegotiation given the wide disparity in haul characteristics as either drivers rejected or dispatchers withheld grossly under-or over-priced hauls. A pricing formula that automatically related fees to the expected costs of individual hauls would stand 24 The recent development and adoption of on-board computers and global positioning devices undoubtedly enhance the ability of dispatchers to monitor driver behavior. On the effects of these new technologies on the governance of trucking, see Baker and Hubbard (2004) . 25 The distribution of compensation methods in the UMTIP survey is broadly consistent with those found in other surveys (see Griffen and Rodriguez, 1992; and Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, 2000) . 26 Approximately half of the local pick-up-and-delivery drivers surveyed, by contrast, reported being paid on an hourly basis (Belman and Monaco, 1998: 42) . Compared to over-the-road drivers, local drivers both spend less time driving and, having fixed routes or territories, are easier to monitor.
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to reduce the incidence of haul rejection and renegotiation relative to either a fixed fee or haul-by-haul pricing.
The problem, as indicated earlier, is finding a formula that accurately tracks drivers' costs but is resistant to driver and carrier manipulation. As in many occupations, hours worked is an important component of driver costs; time on the road or waiting to load or unload is time not available for other productive activities or for leisure. Over-the-road truck drivers are rarely paid on an hourly basis, however, because time "working" is easily manipulated by drivers: Dispatchers cannot easily distinguish hours legitimately incurred working from hours taken as leisure or resulting from poor judgment in route choice or from simple misreporting. (Certainly, the problem of driver speeding would be reduced.) Similarly, miles traveled also correlates with driver costs, including such things as fuel costs and equipment wear and tear as well as work time. But, again, miles traveled is subject to driver manipulation: A driver scheduled to complete a delivery late enough in the day to preclude picking up another load might, for instance, choose to take a "scenic route" to the destination to run up compensation. 
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actual miles, and thus with drivers' costs, bureau miles are outside a driver's control and therefore are not subject to driver (or carrier) manipulation.
Although important, distance only imperfectly captures drivers' costs, omitting such other factors as delays owing to traffic, lack of customer cooperation, and loading and unloading times. The second most common compensation method, "percent revenue," pays drivers a percentage of the freight bill, the fee that a carrier charges the shipper. Compared to mileage-based fees, compensating drivers as a percentage of revenue has the advantage that, in negotiating freight bills with shippers, carriers can take into account non-mileage determinants of cost as well as distance, resulting in a price that is less likely to cause driver (or carrier) dissatisfaction. The greater accuracy of percent-revenue compensation is offset, however, by the fact that freight bills are vulnerable to potential manipulation by carriers who, despite federal regulations requiring carriers to make their freight bills available to drivers (49 Code of Federal Regulations 376.12), have been known to under-report, divert, or otherwise conceal the true freight bill in order to lower a driver's compensation. Industry participants report that driver suspicions about this sort of carrier opportunism is an obstacle to more extensive use of revenue-based compensation: "There is a mistrust of how carriers represent their [freight bills] to owner-operators, says Glen Rice, a consultant and former driver adviser for Landstar Inway. 'Are they lying? They could be,' he says. 'Are they taking a little off the top? Not showing all the charges?'" (Heine, 1999) . 27 Presumably, driver resistance to the use of percent-revenue can be overcome where greater pricing accuracy is sufficiently valuable. According to the theory, the value of pricing accuracy should be related to variance in haul characteristics: The larger the variation in relevant haul attributes (i.e., attributes that affect the cost or value of providing transportation services), the greater the likelihood of transactors finding 28 Note that the substantive incentives of drivers under mileage and percent-revenue pricing are identical: Under both schemes, driver compensation is determined ex ante and is unaffected by driver behavior at the margin. In the case of revenue-based pay, a driver (whether an employee or owner operator) receives a pre-agreed percentage of the freight bill paid by the shipper to the carrier; since both the percent and the freight bill are known at the time a driver takes the load, the driver knows exactly how much money a particular load will yield. The same is true of mileage-based pay, however. Because the amount a driver receives is set according to "bureau miles" rather than actual miles driven, the compensation of drivers paid on a mileage basis is independent of route selection or other decisions that a driver makes during the haul. With their compensation fixed ex ante, drivers effectively become residual claimants on each haul, leaving them with high-powered incentives to select the best possible route given road conditions, to avoid accidents and other sources of delays, and otherwise to undertake any activity that lowers the cost of current loads or advances the acquisition of future ones. Thus, whether driver compensation is based on mileage or revenue, the incentives to expend effort on such activities are exactly the same. And by varying the applicable rate-per-mile or driver's share of the freight bill, the two arrangements can be made to generate the same expected payments. 29 See, for instance, Goodson (2000) . Most of the haul attributes identified by Goodson as "driver unfriendly" relate to time spent on non-driving activities: Hand loading and unloading, freight sorting and segregating, numerous stops, city driving, and customer inflexibility or failure to honor schedules, all of which keep drivers off the road and add to the time it takes to complete a haul. 20 themselves outside of the "self-enforcing range," and therefore the higher the value to the parties of pricing arrangements that more accurately track their reservation values.
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According to industry accounts, the most important (non-mileage) factor affecting the desirability of a haul to a driver is the amount of time the driver must spend performing non-driving activities 29 Table   2 reports descriptive statistics for a set of non-driving activities recorded in the UMTIP survey. As seen in the table, the two largest causes of delays for drivers were waiting for dispatch to assign a load and waiting to load or unload. Drivers reported waiting two hours on average for each of these, and as much as six days for dispatch and three days to load or unload. Less than a third of drivers reported not having to wait to load or unload, and only twenty percent reported not having to wait for their most recent haul assignment. In addition to waiting, drivers also often had to spend time on various non-driving tasks, including time actually loading and unloading and connecting or disconnecting trailers (dropping and hooking). As shown on line 8 of table 2, drivers reported spending an average of 85 minutes, and as much as a day-and-a-half on such non-driving tasks. Overall, drivers reported having spent an average of ten hours, and as much as six days, on non-driving activities and waiting on their most recent trip.
30
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test of the equality of two distributions. In a nutshell, the method tests to see whether the maximum differences (both positive and negative) between two distributions are statistically significant. For a brief description, see, STATA Reference Manual.
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To see whether the distributions of non-driving times differed systematically, I first performed a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests on various partitions of the sample. To help visualize the difference, Figure 4 shows the distributions of non-driving times for percentrevenue and by-mile drivers based on estimated means and standard deviations of non-driving time for a leftcensored (at 0) normal distribution. For percent-revenue drivers, the estimated mean and standard deviation were 505 and 1050 minutes (n=162), and for by-mile drivers 280 and 485 (n=411). Consistent with the theory, drivers paid as a percent of revenue appear to experience a greater variance in non-driving times than do drivers paid by mile.
The fact that variance in non-driving time outcomes is greater for percent-revenue drivers than bymile drivers does not explain, however, why non-driving times vary more for some drivers than others.
Ideally, to test the theory, we would like to be able to observe the heterogeneity of the population of hauls from which each driver's hauls are selected. Even though the UMTIP survey contains information only on the attributes of a driver's most recent haul, we may nevertheless gain insights into the source of haul heterogeneity to the extent (i) the distribution of haul characteristics systematically differs between drivers identifiable categories of hauls; or (ii) the attributes of a driver's most recent haul reflect, on average, the distribution of attributes from which the haul was drawn. We might, for example, expect distributions of haul characteristics to be more alike within than between trailer types because of the nature of the loads they carry:
Because dry vans both carry a wide range of products and use standard loading docks and equipment, dry-van may face fewer delays waiting for dispatch and require less time loading and unloading than, say, flatbeds, which carry loads that are often "over-dimensional and short-haul, tend to be high value, and sometimes require slower speeds, alternate routes and even escorts" (Heine, 1999) . If haul attributes do differ by trailer type, we should expect to see corresponding differences in haul pricing methods.
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Although the data show that employees are slightly more likely than owner-operators to pull dry-van than flatbed trailers, the difference in the types of trailers pulled does not appear to be the main determinant of carrier decisions to use owner-operators or employee drivers.
32
Included in the flatbed category are 19 drop deck trailers, which are similar to flatbeds but with lower beds, allowing them to carry taller loads.
23
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the types of trailers UMTIP-surveyed drivers pulled on their last load.
31 Dry vans are the most common type of trailer in the sample (54%), followed by flatbeds (19%) and refrigerated trailers (16% smaller values for employees than for owner-operators. We know from Table 1 Again, the results indicate the distribution of non-driving time for dry vans has significantly lower values than the distribution for non-van trailers.
As was done earlier for the distributions partitioned by compensation method, Figure 5 depicts the differences in the distributions of non-driving times for van and non-van trailers based on the estimated means and standard deviations of non-driving time for a left-censored (at 0) normal distribution. For dry vans, the estimated mean and standard deviation were 279 and 558 minutes (n=366), and for non-vans 448 and 843 (n=265). Again, as expected, non-van trailers exhibit a wider distribution of non-driving times than do dry vans.
Given the finding that the variance of non-driving time is greater for non-van trailers than dry vans, the theory predicts that percent-revenue haul pricing should be more prevalent for non-van trailers than for dry vans. Table 4 shows estimated differences in the use of percent-revenue pricing between trailer types.
The first column shows the percentage of dry-van drivers paid percent-revenue, first, for all drivers and, then, for owner-operators and employees separately. The remaining columns show the corresponding differences in the probability of percent-revenue compensation for all non-van trailers and for each non-van trailer type separately. The comparisons indicate that, with the exception of refrigerated trailers driven by owneroperators, the difference in the likelihood of a driver of a non-van trailer being paid a percentage of revenue relative to a dry-van driver is large, positive and significant (at the .01 level).
As one final test, I estimated the likelihood, contingent on trailer type, of a driver being paid by percent revenue as a function of the driver's own reported total non-driving time on the premise that the attributes of a driver's most recent haul will reflect, on average, the distribution of attributes from which it was drawn. The results of a probit estimation including non-drive time and a dummy for non-van trailers were Again, the results show that the adoption of percent-revenue haul pricing is associated with greater attribute heterogeneity, as predicted.
Conclusions
The role of relationship-specific investments, or reliance, in motivating contracts has been extensively analyzed and shown to be important empirically. Transactors also sometimes contract, however, in settings that do not seem to involve significant relationship-specific investments. Such contracts tend also to be unusual in that, though long term, they typically leave the parties considerable discretion to walk away from the agreement and often make termination the sole remedy in the case of dissatisfaction.
This paper examined one potential reason for contracts with these features: economizing on the cost of determining prices for heterogeneous transactions. This motive for contracting is essentially a variant of the search-or sorting-cost economizing rationale for bundling suggested by Barzel (1982) and developed by Kenney and Klein (1983) extended to sequential transactions. An essential feature of that rationale is that product attributes are inherently variable and buyers value quality similarly. Because price affects the payoff to each transaction, each buyer has an incentive to inspect the product in an attempt to determine its true value and an appropriate price. But because buyers all value the product similarly, price affects the distribution of the surplus but not the efficiency of a transaction. As a result, time and effort spent appraising and pricing individual items are largely wasteful, and the gains from trade will be increased to the extent arrangements, such as bundling, can be devised that reduce these costs.
Except that exchange takes place sequentially, transactions between carriers and over-the-road truckers broadly conform to the search-cost economizing model. Hauls are intrinsically heterogeneous, varying in time, weight, bulk, origin and destination, and shipper and receiver characteristics, among other features that affect transport costs. Although the large number and high fungibility of transportation assets assures that most hauls could be carried by a number of different drivers at similar cost, determining that cost for a given haul is a nontrivial matter. Agreements between carriers and truckers to adopt a formula for determining prices on a series of hauls reduce the need to price each haul individually, leaving both parties potentially better off. Analysis of the choice of pricing formula supports this interpretation of the motive for contracting in carrier-driver relations and adds more broadly to a growing body of evidence indicating a role for price in avoiding contract evasion and post-agreement frictions (see, e.g., Oyer, 2004, and Crocker and Masten, 1991) .
Although the motive for contracting as a form of "intertemporal bundling" discussed here appears to fit the circumstances of long-haul trucking reasonable well, it is not, and is not meant to be, a general theory of contracting. Equipment leases and franchise agreements, for instance, are often long-term (and easily terminable) but are more likely motivated by information-transfer considerations than the heterogeneous-transaction pricing issues emphasized here (see, e.g., Masten and Snyder, 1993) . More generally, the protection and motivation of relationship-specific investments (or reliance) is undoubtedly the most general and prevalent function of contracting. What this analysis does suggest is that not all contractual relationships fit the reliance-protection model. To the extent that contract law and judicial enforcement policies are designed with that model in mind, the existence of other motives for contracting may justify the tailoring of rules or more discriminating enforcement to reflect differences in contract functions. 
